he seeks, inter alia, to determine the precise cognitive content of scientific claims, to facilitate rigorous criticism of scientific reasoning and explanations, to measure the degree of support for theoretical claims and factual predictions (preferably by exhibiting their logical relations to well established evidential claims), to develop explicit norms governing the justified acceptance of scientific claims, and to criticize, clarify, and evaluate major theories and explanations by use of these norms and this apparatus.
The explanations and theories which are the subject of philosophical investigation are produced by scientists, not philosophers. So too are the (often very special) experiences, observations, and experiments which, according to the logicist, are the primary source of justification for explanatory and theoretical claims. The philosopher must be fair to these sources of his enterprise in carrying out his work. But it is the philosopher who first reveals theoretical structure perspicuously, who clarifies theories and the cognitive standards by which they are judged, and who assesses the logical consequences of theoretical claims. Or so, at least, the logicist maintains.
To epitomize those features of ideal-typical logicism of interest to us, let me encapsulate the position by stating the logicist thesis, (L):
(L) (i) There are universally valid methodological and epistemological standards by means of which both science in general and the special sciences may be philosophically evaluated.
(ii) The sole inputs needed for evaluating a theory (explanation, law claim, etc.) as of a given time are (a) knowledge of the formal (logical, syntactic and semantic) structure of theories (explanations, law claims, etc.), and (b) properly parsed statements of the total relevant evidence available at that time together with a properly parsed statement of the theory (explanation, law claim, etc.).
As will be seen later, this encapsulation of the position needs to be altered, but it will serve us well as a vehicle for sharpening the contrast between historicism and logicism. When an externalist philosopher is presented with historical cases which do not conform to his avowed standards, he may claim to be in a strong position. Thus, in our case, the logicist may respond to such criticism in the following vein:
It would be a mistake to require that my reconstruction of, say, the justification for accepting a certain theory imitate the evaluation 5 of that theory by working scientists. Scientists are often irrational in the beliefs they accept-and in the acceptance or evaluation of scientific theories there are factors, such as the messiness of the evidence, the logical inadequacies of the formulation of the theory and the statements of the evidence, etc., which make it especially difficult to reach a sound judgement. 6 Precisely the virtue of a purely logical and epistemological basis for the standards of justification in science is that such a basis enables philosophers and scientists to show how things ought to be, to develop a vehicle for criticism of specific theories, explanations, and justifications. It is, perhaps, more surprising that science comes as close to rationality as it does than it is that your case histories depart from the logico-epistemological ideals established by philosophers.
According to its own self image, then, logicist philosophy can supply the standards of cognitive value in terms of which the "moves" or "positions" in the "game" of science should be judged. This is compatible with the claims that real science is a complex, many-faceted, impurely cognitive enterprise, that goals other than cognitive ones affect the professional decisions and behavior of scientists, and that, in any case, scientists are imperfectly rational. Accordingly, the ideal evaluations (and prescriptions) of logicist programs need not bear any simple relation to historical science. In particular, no set of case histories, by itself, can show that a particular logicist proposal regarding the ideals, standards, and criteria of rationality is mistaken.
This logicist way of dealing with difficult cases is not uncommon in the literature. The reader who wishes to see how easily it allows one to deal with specific case histories will enjoy working out a response along these lines to Brush's treatment of J. C. Maxwell and the development of the kinetic theory of gases ( [2] , pp. 1168-1169). 7 (ii) Three Difficulties for Logicism. (1) The technique for dealing 6Furthermore, as historians and sociologists of science have emphasized, there are many noncognitive factors relevant to theory acceptance in real life. These include such diverse matters as the difficulty of the mathematical symbolism in which a theory is couched, the availability of reliable measuring apparatus, the prestige and authority of those favoring opposing theories, political factors affecting the institutions making research grants, etc.
7It is important to see that the dismissal of history as irrelevant because of its irrationality is not the only logicist response available to Brush's case history. In particular, the line taken by Salmon in [48] (see note 3 above) suggests that he would treat Brush's case as reflecting defects in hypothetico-deductive methodology which were known to exist on strictly philosophical grounds. Salmon would presumably argue that his Bayesian methodology provides the grounds for understanding both the defeccts in H-D methodology and the rationality of Maxwell's procedure. 6 with hard cases just described is, however, too easy. It makes real science totally irrelevant to the evaluation of whatever cognitive standards a philosopher might propose. This irrelevance is the price of the impregnability to historically based attacks. Consider: suppose two philosophers propose conflicting evaluative standards for explanations. Suppose further that the informal judgements which scientists in fact make in a large range of cases fit fairly well with one of these standards and very badly with the other. Suppose yet further that the scientists who become aware of explicit statements of these standards uniformly hold that the one is sound, the other not, and that they seek to improve the few explanations departing from the favored standard which they had hitherto accepted. Such a situation would not be flatly decisive-there might yet be adequate arguments to show that the disfavored standard was nonetheless more appropriate for, say, achieving the truth. Surely, however, the logicist argument being considered goes too far in dismissing the reaction of the scientific community as utterly irrelevant.
(2) If a logicist is to capture the standard of evaluation appropriate to science (or to some science), he must capture the formal structure of the metatheoretic notions (e.g., "confirmation," "explanation," "theory") relevant to the practice of the scientist. But the continued debate among philosophers about the formal properties of such notions shows that there is more than one plausible formal reconstruction of such notions. Unless a successful a priori(!) proof can be constructed to show that only one of these formal reconstructions is relevant to all cases of confirmation, to all explanations, or to all theories, a case by case consideration of the appropriateness of one rather than another reconstruction will be required. Furthermore, the development of science is relevant; not only would one have to show that theories, explanations, and confirmations all have the same logical form in all sciences, but also in all stages of the development of science. That this can be proved, or even argued abstractly, is most implausible.8 (3) It has been argued recently that the reconstructions encountered in the vast majority of the logicist literature are not of the right type to employ if the enterprise is to succeed, for they exclude essential 8Considerations of this sort lead Mary Hesse, who believes that the "norms or criteria of 'good science' . . . are not timeless," to suggest that "there will be no simple process of testing a proposed logic against historical examples-the relation of logic and cases will rather be one of mutual comparison and correction" ( [22] , pp. 6-7).. This process of mutual correction will, itself, prove extremely delicate, especially if the concerns mentioned in passing in note 3 about the influence of philosophical methodologies on the outcome of case studies are taken seriously.
7
"inputs" which are required if one's evaluation of scientific theories is to be sound. Lakatos is perhaps the most important of a large number of philosophers9 who have argued that the career of a theory is, at least sometimes, more important than the formal relations between evidence claims and theoretical postulates at any stage of the theory's history. Relevant factors here include, arguably, the theory's ability to accommodate auxiliary hypotheses, its capacity to reshape itself under competitive pressure or in the face of experimental difficulties, its success in predicting facts before they are discovered, etc. These factors are not included in traditional models of theory evaluation-and their inclusion requires a significant departure from the spirit of logicism. This departure is necessitated by the fact that a theory, considered as a product, does not always reflect the intricacies of its career. To understand its career, one must compare materials taken from different stages of its development, materials not included in the finished structure of the theory nor in the totality of evidential claims. Yet, by studying the career of a theory one may learn that it has hidden strengths, that it promises to overcome the difficulties revealed in a logistic evaluation of its present state and its present fit with the evidence. The significance of such cross-temporal considerations will be examined below.
For the moment, it seems fair to claim that these difficulties show that a "pure" logicism will not do as it stands. Whatever else the historically rooted criticisms of philosophy of science have accomplished, they have forced philosophers of science to bring their abstract methodologies closer to real cases and to scientific practice. They have increased the burden of proof on the philosopher to show that his "rational reconstructions" of the epistemological problems faced by scientists are relevant and applicable to real theories. As McMullin puts it, "the logicist must make sure that his intuitions are anchored in the experience which the term he is explicating is intended to articulate; the more complex the experience, the more he will have to rely on the help of descriptivist techniques" ( [36] , typescript p. 5).
(iii) Historicism. There is no single historicist position. The simplest way to state what is common to the great variety of historicist positions is to restate their polar opposite in oversimplified form. Formulate logicism as the view that scientific materials may properly be evaluated by reference to their formal structure and the evidence available at 9Cf. [29] and [30] . Among the many articles relevant to this position are [11] , [35] , [36] , [37] , [38] , [62] , [63] , [64] , [65] , and [67] . I am grateful to Professor McMullin for advance copies of [35] and [36] . 8 a given time in abstraction from further historical considerations. Then, to a first approximation, historicists hold that logicist tenets either become irrelevant to real science or result in seriously mistaken evaluations of it precisely because they proceed "in abstraction from further historical considerations." The minimal historicist claim may thus be formulated as follows:
The evaluation of a theory (explanation, etc.) as of a given time cannot be accomplished solely by reference to the formal structure and content of the theory and the relevant evidence available at that time.
It will soon be clear that (MH) is compatible with a great variety of positions, some of which are quite logicist in spirit. (One reason for discussing below the variety of factors which have been considered relevant to assessing the degree of support for theoretical claims is to give some flesh to the claim that (MH) encompasses a great variety of positions.) But before the argument turns in this direction, it will be useful to consider a stronger version of historicism, to discuss the relevance of the study of the history of science to the historicistlogicist dispute, and to clarify certain methodological questions.
I take strong historicism to amount to the denial of (Li), i.e., to come to the following:
There are no universally valid methodological and epistemological standards by means of which both science in general and the special sciences may be evaluated.10
Paul Feyerabend, in [12] , advocates a strong historicism. He maintains that all codified methodologies and all standards of evaluation for theories (etc.) should be taken, at best, as rules of thumb. He argues, in part from cases, that all traditional methodological rules have been broken by scientists in the course of doing good science ( [12] , pp. 21 ff.), and that all of the traditional standards of evaluation have led to substantive misevaluations of sound theories. Furthermore, he argues, the attempt to enforce any codified standard or methodology will block or inhibit the steps crucial to major theoretical advance.1l I'This denial sometimes rests on the denial of (Liia), i.e., on the denial of the claim that there is a unique formal structure for theories, explanations, etc. Among those who would deny (Liia) are Hesse [22] , Naess [41] , Shapere [56] , and Toulmin [62] .
1l Feyerabend argues that we must often use theories with smaller empirical content than their available competitors and protect them from known empirical refutations by use of ad hoc strategems in order to be able to discover the facts crucial to theory revision (cf. the treatment of Brownian motion in [13] , pp. 175-176) and to obtain evidence against currently accepted theories (cf. the treatment of the impact 9 His position, then, is that no universal standards have in fact governed science and that, in principle, none ought to.
It has often been noted that while justification and evaluation are at the center of logicist concern, description is often at the center of historicist concern. It is typical for the historicist to devote considerable effort to determining and describing both the professed and the actual norms and standards employed in actual science(s). One significant point of such descriptions is to show that a variety of norms, methodologies, values, and goals have operated in science and to use this "plain truth" in an attempt to show the incorrectness of any proposed set or hierarchy of norms, methodologies, values, or goals.
There is a familiar difficulty with this position, recently articulated again by McMullin ( [36] ). Neither the professions nor the practices of actual scientists establish strong historicism. What is needed in addition to the knowledge of the professed and the practiced methodologies and standards of scientists is some independent means of showing these methodologies and standards to be appropriate and correct, at least within the context in which they are employed, or some means of establishing in general that the highest standards applicable to a science are those set "internally" by scientists acting in their professional capacities. And neither course will prove easy.
First of all, even the strong historicist must admit that there have been episodes in the history of science in which not only individual scientists, but also scientific institutions and communities have flown in the face of sound scientific method. (The Lysenko era in Russian genetics and agronomy will presumably suffice as an example.) But this admission requires the use of some "external" standard, not derived directly from the practice or professions of the institution or community in question. ' 12In [62] , Toulmin proposes a novel historicist solution to this problem. He attempts to isolate a scientific discipline as an entity with certain features independent of the individuals, institutions and communities practicing that discipline. Disciplines can be characterized, inter alia, by the problems and explanatory ideals they recognize, the approved techniques, instruments and theories to be used in dealing with their problems, and the population of concepts employed in and crucial to the discipline. The discipline, then, defines a series of goals (the solution of certain problems) and the techniques, concepts, and styles of theorizing appropriate to their solution. The gap between the scientific actualities and the disciplinary goals sets the "internal" rather than "external" standard by which, say, the Lysenkoites should be judged to have taken a drastic backward step.
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actual methods, standards, and goals of scientists, scientific institutions, and scientific communities does not free the historicist from the need for "externalist" or "critical" argument, transcending considerations limited to the methodologies of the day. Pure historicism, conceived as a descriptivist position, is no more viable than pure logicism. We must be concerned, therefore, to locate the soundest position between these poles and to occupy it.
The Place of History of Science: A Negative Preliminary Assessment.
But what role is the history of science to play in tempering logicism? It is not yet established that there is a significant role for it to play. R. Giere has forcefully maintained in [17] that arguments like those so far employed show at most that the need was to bring the formal apparatus of the philosopher into contact with real science, not with history of science. In particular, Giere holds that an analysis of the concept of confirmation employed in contemporary science reveals that the validity of certain tests requires that the outcome be predicted before the experiment was undertaken. Accordingly, the evaluation of a theory by means of such a test rests on information about the temporal order in which hypotheses were propounded and experiments performed. (Giere thus accepts the first methodological thesis of the present paper, though he denies the second.) But since Giere claims to obtain this result from an analysis of confirmation and not from Toulmin's apparatus, however, makes it impossible to establish the relevant standard, or to apply it to cases, except ex post facto. First, disciplines evolve internally and split up into subdisciplines with independent lives. Episodes like the Lysenko episode could be part of such changes in or of discipline, thus compromising the relevance of prior disciplinary standards. Second, it is not obvious that one can separate the "internal" from the "external" as clearly as is needed. Can we separate the discipline clearly enough from the community and institutions practicing it to allow the requisite independence of disciplinary standards and methods from all community standards and methods? (On what grounds would the standards of some particular discipline-or even broader inter-community standards-pertain to the Lysenkoites? For each proposed answer it is open to challenge whether the Lysenkoites were practioners of, or owed allegiance to, that discipline.) Finally, supposing these difficulties overcome, since Toulmin's view allows disciplines to evolve by the introduction of conceptual variants most of which will fail and only a few of which will succeed-success and failure being established by the survival of the variants and their disciplines through time-it will still not be possible to rule out definitively procedures, theories, and explanations like those implicit in Lysenko's "vernalization" except ex post facto. Toulmin embraces this last claim without qualms (cf. [65] , p. 400); he insists that definite judgments of this kind can be made only after the fact and that all that is available in advance is a "rational bet."
Toulmin's criteria exclude the "external" political support for Lysenko as extrascientific, but they still do not allow an adequate and timely internal evaluation of Lysenko's demerits. Their fatal flaw is in refusing (or seeming to) any authority to supposedly external, i.e., extradisciplinary, standards. 11 the study of historical cases, he holds that nothing essential is gained by using historical studies and non-contemporary cases. The chief philosophical benefit of the recent attention to the history of science, as he sees it, is that it has forced philosophers to deal with real science; the remaining benefits are primarily pedagogical, and stem from the ease of exposition and the relatively lower complexity of historical cases as compared with contemporary ones. His central claim is that the argument to date has failed to show that philosophy of science is significantly dependent on specifically historical considerations, that it will take a stronger argument to establish my metamethodological thesis. '3 The matter may be put more broadly. Many historicist philosophers are seeking a dynamics of science; they accuse the logicists of missing essential phenomena by restricting themselves to a statics of science. But, supposing this complaint to be well-founded, it is still not obvious that scrupulous attention to the history of science is required. After all, the development and justification of Newton's dynamics was not dependent on scrupulous attention to specifically historical studies of the physical systems to which it applied. (This is not to deny the need to determine the values of a variety of parameters at different times in order to test Newtonian theory; it is to deny a significant place to specifically historical techniques and considerations.)
Could (i) "Rationality": An Accordion Term. Much current debate focuses on problems concerning the rationality of holding certain claims or theories, the rationality of changing one's beliefs or theories, and so on. The expansion and contraction of the accordion term "rationality" and its cognates mars much of the debate. In the present subsection I will note one dimension of ambiguity in the use of the term, in the next another. I will also illustrate the consequences of ignoring or mishandling these ambiguities.
To begin, however, note that all of the uses of terms like "rational" considered below are end-relative. That is, whether an action, policy, decision, or whatever, is considered rational will depend on the end or goal in view with respect to which the action (etc.) is assessed. (Not all uses of the term are end-relative in this way.) I will ultimately distinguish four cases of primary interest for the sequel. They involve four different but interlocking ends in terms of which actions (e.g., accepting a theory) or policies (of, e.g., theory evaluation) may be assessed. Because of the interlocking character of the ends in question, it becomes very difficult to determine whether or not there is a univocal and general account of rationality (or of the rationality of, say, theory acceptance) in science. (But cf. below, note 15.) I shall not face this problem in the present paper, but I shall argue that we must have recourse to the history of science if we are to resolve it properly.
Among the many uses of the term "rational,"' two are common-and, alas, commonly conflated-in philosophy of science. The first use is broader and, loosely speaking, methodological; the second narrower and primarily epistemological. In the broad use, an action is rational, roughly speaking, when all things considered it will or ought to bring about a desired end. Rationality in this sense is largely a matter of tactics and strategy. Thus if we suppose that science is primarily a truth-seeking enterprise, it will be rational for scientists to do that which will probably yield the greatest degree of truth. This is, of course, no simple matter. Suppose, for example, that at a given moment scientists know of two competing theories T and T' that the net truth content of T is greater than that of T'. Suppose that they also know (a) that whether they accept either T or T' it is likely that they will soon be led to some T" with an even greater truth content, and (b) that due to the psychological and calculational difficulty of working with T they are likely to arrive at such a richer T" sooner if they work with T' rather than with T. In the current sense of "rationality," it may prove more rational to accept T', the 13 "less true" theory, rather than T. 14 (Note that there are now serious difficulties regarding the univocity of "accept" and "reject" in this paragraph.) However, the term "rational" is also used in just such discussions in a sense according to which it is never rational for a truth seeker to accept a claim (or theory) known to have less truth content than an available competitor. In this narrower sense of the term, all things may not be considered; one may only take account of the degree to which the desired goal has been achieved and the extent of the shortfall from that goal. This is the sense of the term which has been of central interest to logicists. Indeed, speaking generally, this is the sense of the term relevant to most of the recent attempts to formalize notions like those of epistemological justification or warrant, epistemological acceptability, rational belief sets, and so on. 15 It is important to realize that the term "rational" and its cognates are commonly used in both the broad and the narrow ways characterized above. The literature is filled with discussions that fail to make their point because they overlook or mishandle such ambiguities in terminology. I believe, for example, that Toulmin's arguments that logicists have conflated rationality with logicality are invalidated by their failure to take this ambiguity properly into account."6 He holds (mistakenly, as I shall argue shortly) that the narrowly epistemological sense of rationality is restricted to a measure of the logicality of a system 141 owe this suggestion to Jon Adler. In [23] , N. Koertge also discusses cases in which it may be rational (in the present sense) to protect "weak" theories from their currently stronger competitors. '5Professor P. Quinn (Brown University, personal communication) has suggested that the sense of "rationality" has not changed in these two assessments, just the end-in-view with respect to which rationality is assessed. Thus, in the situation sketched in the text, if one's aim were to maximize truth content at each stage of inquiry, it would be rational so far forth to adopt T, while if one's aim were to maximize the rate at which truth content increases, it would be rational to adopt T'. (Incidentally, cf. [19] regarding the difficulty of formalizing the notion of truth content which is required here.)
Little depends on whether one states the point in Quinn's way or mine: in assessing the rationality of a means, one's calculation depends utterly on the end-in-view. One advantage of my formulation, though, is the rarity of pure assessments of rationality-asmeans. Where two ends, applied to a given case, dictate incompatible actions, it may be rational to act on one rather than the other because of further ends-in-view or because of the undesirable side effects which acting on one of the ends is likely to have. Sometimes, of course, it will be possible to have separate research groups pursuing separate aims and separate programs of investigation. But whether this is even possible depends on the problem, and whether it is feasible (given the limitations on available resources and so on) depends on further circumstances. Thus, a full assessment of rationality involves a weighing of ends as well as means, a feature my formulation is calculated to bring out.
16Cf. [65] , [63] , and Chapter I of [62] . McMullin's criticism of Toulmin on this issue in [38] has been helpful to me. 14 (plus, presumably, the epistemological acceptability of certain "observation claims"). His argument is that this sense of rationality is irrelevant to the (true) rationality of science which is concerned with the cross-temporal strategies for self-correction and error elimination. Toulmin's contrast between logicality and temporality is specious because logical assessments of theories, though they are made at a certain time, may take into account not only the latest formulation of the theory as a closed system and the current status of the evidence, but also considerations concerning the career of the theory and the development of the evidence through time. Points (1) and (2) undercut Toulmin's claim that a logicist conflation of rationality and logicality is fatal to the logicist program; they show that his requirement that the broad sense of rationality be largely independent of logicality is based on a confusion. Point (3) (which will be supported below) rests on a disagreement over the proper analysis of rationality in the narrow sense. As pursued below, it will ultimately lead to a revision in tenet (Lii) of the logicist program. Point (3) suggests that the history of science can play a key role in clarifying the interplay between rationality in the broad and the narrow senses and in clarifying the role of temporal considerations in assessing rationality in the narrow sense.
(ii) Prescription vs. Evaluation. A second dimension of ambiguity in the use of terms like "rationality" arises from the differences between "decision contexts" (D-contexts) and "evaluation contexts" (E-contexts). ' ) When decisions are difficult, when the question faced is a hard one, it is often necessary to act (and in such cases inaction is also an act) in spite of substantial ignorance and with little or no opportunity to gain new information before the decision must be made. The forward-looking character of D-context questions, the possibility of unexpected side effects accompanying any decision, the variety of "external" constraints typically affecting an agent in D-contexts, these all make the standard of rationality in such contexts far less stringent than it is in E-contexts. It is, for example, often rational to expend considerable effort inquiring further into theories which it is by no means rational to accept on the available evidence.
In E-contexts, where the issues to be considered are retrospective, one often evaluates the action, policy, or theory of concern with respect to a single value (e.g., truth content) while treating the available evidence as if it were closed and complete. Such evaluations often concern a value or an issue not considered by, or not of central importance to, the agents who employed the policy or theory being evaluated. The outcome of the evaluation is not, in general, affected by the degree to which the agents were concerned with this value or by their ignorance of crucial information. In short, all of the following factors contribute to the stringency of evaluations in E-contexts: the (pretended) closure of the evidence which allows the evaluator to ignore potential side effects, the freedom to ignore considerations irrelevant to the value in terms of which the evaluation is carried out, and the freedom to abstract from the "external" constraints and motivations of the agents involved.
One particular complication must be mentioned here concerning double perspective cases. Consider, for example, Galileo's support of heliocentrism in the Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. Our questions about this support typically involve a compounding of Galileo's perspective with our own. The distinction between D-and E-contexts is significant here. Notice, for example, the differences between two questions which Galileo might have asked himself: "Should I treat the unresolved dynamical problems facing heliocentrism as if they will not provide insuperable obstacles for that theory?" (a D-context question) and "Is heliocentrism better supported on the available evidence than geocentrism?" (an E-context question). Now if we ask whether heliocentrism or geocentrism was better supported when Galileo wrote his Dialogue, we must separate the answers we get using our criteria of support and using criteria available to him. And when we evaluate Galileo's decision to treat the dynamical obstacles to heliocentrism as if they would, one and all, be overcome, we must appreciate the fact that we are working in an E-context; the evaluation may proceed either by our criteria or by our reconstruction of (a limited subset of) the criteria available to Galileo and his contemporaries.
It should be clear that evaluative considerations are relevant to Galileo's decision-e.g., his estimate of the degree of support enjoyed by the heliocentric theory. It should also be clear that one may restrict one's concern in the context of decision to a certain range of issues. If, for example, one wishes to base a decision as to how to treat the dynamical difficulties of heliocentrism solely on epistemological considerations, one might well base the decision on his best estimate of the way(s) in which the remaining dynamical difficulties might be overcome and of the degree of support enjoyed by the theory. But in any case, because this is a D-context problem, we must not hold the agent responsible for information or criteria of choice available only after his decision. The character of D-context issues requires that they be faced from the perspective of a suitably placed agent employing the theoretical and calculational apparatus available at the time of decision and facing the then pertinent uncertainties. Failure to take the agent's perspective into account in this way means failure to evaluate the decision of concern.
The distinction between D-and E-contexts is often more helpful than the traditional distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification. For example, as the discussion of Galileo just showed, evaluations affect decisions, including those leading to scientific discoveries. It is also obvious that decisions (such as those regarding which of two theories to test) affect evaluations. Thus the common temptation to treat considerations belonging to the context of justification as irrelevant and useless in the context of discovery18 does not carry over to D-and E-contexts. Indeed, by clarifying the differences in circumstance and purpose between evaluation and decision making, a philosopher employing the latter distinction can offer an account of the reasons for which, in particular cases, considerations employed This discussion has highlighted the importance of distinguishing between prescriptive norms (to be applied in D-contexts) and evaluative norms (to be applied in E-contexts). When this distinction is crossed with that drawn above between the methodological and the epistemological senses of "rationality," one obtains a group of four complexly interrelated contexts in which philosophical evaluation is pertinent. These are set forth in the following It is worth noting that the different enterprises listed in this table are often conflated with one another in the philosophical literature. One reason for this, I believe, is the use of such Janus-faced terms as "justified belief" and "rational acceptability." 19 Justification, after all, is retrospective, for it is largely a function of evidential history. Belief, on the other hand, involves a strongly prospective component, for it serves as the antecedent ground of intentional action. But, 191 owe this point to Phil Quinn. For the purposes of the following discussion it should be observed that the question whether or not a belief is justified, whether or not it is rationally acceptable, is quite independent of the subjective belief states of scientists. The problem is not which subjective belief states scientists ought to be in (a matter which is seldom under voluntary control), but which premises they ought to employ in planning their actions, evaluating their theories, and so on. The standards of belief being explored pertain to communities, not merely to individuals.
Evaluative (E-context)

Prescriptive (Dcontext)
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as I have argued, assessments of rationality in D-contexts often differ markedly from those in E-contexts; if one is to understand the deep connections between evaluation and prescription properly, one must separate the retrospective and the prospective considerations implicit in concepts like that of justified belief. 20 Against this background it will be useful to highlight the differences among EE, EM, PE, and PM by noting that each of these enterprises has different aims. Very roughly, these are, in order: to estimate the truth content of claims as revealed by the available evidence, to estimate the scientific utility of claims and procedures as revealed by their track record in use, to determine how to maximize the rate at which the truth content of our knowledge increases, and to determine how to maximize the rate at which the scientific utility of our procedures, theories, etc. increases. Accordingly, each enterprise has its own criteria of rationality-criteria which interlock, interact, and adjust to each other in a variety of ways. It follows that in appraising the "rational acceptability" of a theory, one must consider different questions according to which of these four enterprises is at stake. 
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claims!) Again, the tradition holds that only logical and semantic relations among evidence statements and theoretical statements carry epistemic weight so that, e.g., whether or not a bit of evidence is in hand before the theory is stated or only after it has been predicted by use of the theory makes no epistemic difference.
These two epistemic claims are currently being challenged. (Cf. [40] .) This complicates the ongoing debate in a number of ways:
(1) It means that the "rational reconstructions" of case histories hitherto employed will be disputed. For a philosopher subscribing to the above epistemological tenets, the task of EE will be greatly simplified by rationally reconstructing any case studies of interest so as to exclude "irrelevant" genetic and temporal considerations. Indeed, perspicuous formal representation of a case for the purpose of epistemic evaluation will require the use of a symbolism which treats theories and evidence as wholes "considered either at particular times or apart from time" ([65], p. 404). For a philosopher who disputes the above epistemological tenets, the very rational reconstructions from which the case study starts will exclude crucial and relevant information. The whole enterprise will therefore be suspect ab initio.
(2) The resultant debate will likely be flawed by confusion over the sources of the objections to the reconstructions of historical cases. These objections may rest on a variety of differences regarding the proper reading of the historical record, the information relevant to epistemological evaluation, and the uses to which the reconstruction is to be put. Only in unusual cases will it be clear whether a challenge to the reconstruction of a case history rests on differences in epistemological doctrine rather than on disagreements about the historical substance of the case or on differences in the uses to which the case is to be put. Confusion of this sort is especially likely since the logicist will tend to reject all attacks on his views that draw on the temporal order of events as misconceiving his enterprise.
(3) Challenges to particular logicist positions may be (but need not be) allied to an all-out attack on logicism in general. But even when it is clear that such an all-out attack is involved, matters are complicated by the need to separate other enterprises (e.g., PE, EM and PM) from EE, the logicist's true home. It is surely legitimate for the logicist to limit his concern to EE without giving these other undertakings much consideration. On the other hand, because the enterprises do impinge on each other, specific criticism of specific logicist positions as yielding untenable consequences for the other enterprises is possible. In this delicate situation, few philosophers have been clear enough in delimiting the purpose of their arguments. 
On What Does Theory Support Depend?
In the present section, I shall take a very brief glance at the contemporary debate over confirmation, corroboration, and support. My concern is to exhibit some of the great variety of independent variables on which theory support has plausibly been alleged to depend. I shall not, therefore, consider any details of the logic of support; indeed my primary sources for this discussion are the (often logically naive) writings of historically oriented philosophers rather than those of inductive logicians. However, the crude botanization of views achieved here will prove useful in advancing the discussion of the place of history of science within philosophy of science.
All of the confusions discussed in the preceding section infect the literature on theory support. Most discussions are quite unclear about the criteria by which proposed support functions should be judged. As we shall see, a number of proposals introduce a "personal factor" into support functions. An alert logicist, in response to these proposals, might argue that the very introduction of subjective or perspectival factors into the proposed support functions shows that they are serving the ends of PM or EM or some other undertaking rather than those of EE, and that the criteria by which they should be judged are thus not the same as the criteria by which a logicist support function should be judged.22 The sequel will show that this argument is mistaken, both in its rigid separation of the criteria relevant to EM, PM and PE from the criteria relevant to EE and in its a priori rejection of all subjective and perspectival considerations from evaluative epistemology.
To facilitate the discussion of theory support, the following notation will be used: 'ST ,t' will stand for the degree of support for theory T on evidence e at time t, and 'ST,e, = S(x,y,.. .,z)' will stand for the claim that STe,t is a function of the variables x,y,..., and z.
It will be noticed that I often write 'T' as 'T(t)', i.e., I treat T as time-dependent. This is in order not to beg the question whether theories have a fixed formal structure and/or a fixed set of empirical consequences. If they do, then there is a To such that (t) (T(t) = To). But if not-if, for example, the career of a theory is relevant to its epistemic evaluation-then the notation remains adequate.
Using this notation, traditional empiricist logicism holds that the 22Though, as Ron Giere has kindly reminded me, Bayesian accounts of theory evaluation like those in Salmon's [49] and Shimony's [57] are logicist in character even though they employ "subjective" input in the form of prior probabilities.
INEXTRICABILITY OF HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY form of (quantitative and qualitative) measures of theoretical support is (1) STe,t = S(T(t),e(t)).
Perhaps the most radical challenge to this view comes from Feyerabend who holds that all evidence is radically theory-laden in a way which depends on the choices made by the person evaluating the theory. Thus Feyerabend says that "a theory may be inconsistent with the evidence, not because it is incorrect, but because the evidence [like all evidence for Feyerabend!] is contaminated" ([12], p. 46) . On Feyerabend's view, the seriousness of the inconsistency between theory and evidence is a function of how seriously we take certain auxiliary theories and hypotheses, i.e., of the way in which we conceive or treat the evidence. It follows that no evidence is objectively and interpersonally fixed; all evidence is interpreted and.weighted, and both the interpretation and the weighting depend upon the evaluator. 23 
Accordingly, Feyerabend holds (2) ST, e,t = Sp(T(t),e(P,t))
where P is the person evaluating the theory.
It should be noted that where two different persons, P and Q have different support functions, i.e., where may also be facts f,+ ...fo, believed relevant,  for which the theory has no account, and facts fo+ ...f, which, prima  facie, falsify the theory. Then e(t) = f,,..., 
=S(T(t),b(t),e(t)).26
Musgrave, in arguing against each of the positions just ascribed to Zahar, maintains that the relevant measure of the novelty of a fact which a certain theory accounts for is whether or not the best of the hitherto available theories could account for it. (This measure of novelty would explain the increasing difficulty of major theoretical innovation as our theoretical knowledge expands.) If we let 'T*(t)' stand for the best of the competing theories available at t, this proposal comes to ( 
7) STe,t =S(T(t),T*(t),e(t)).
Many logicists would find this proposal congenial, for it allows a strictly formal development of the support function ST, t. 27 The sole historical input required to determine the degree of support for T, other than the evidence e(t), is supplied by determining which theory 26Levi [33] and Cohen [7] may be read as treating support in this way, though the former's system seems more suited for the purposes of PM and the latter's more suited to those of EE. 27(7) is preferable to (6) on this score because T*(t) is more readily formalizable than the inchoate and often incoherent "background knowledge," b(t). 27 stock, to deal directly with the challenge that the principal benefit to be obtained from historical studies is improved contact with actual science, that no distinctive benefit is obtained from historical studies which could not be obtained from studies of contemporary science and its workings. To meet this challenge, it will be useful to consider three sets of problems, namely those surrounding (1) the use of rational reconstructions in philosophy (and the relation of such reconstructions to "real science" and "real history"), (2) the proper weakening of logicism in the light of our previous results, and (3) the "historical" and "temporal" character of theories. In dealing with each group of problems, I will exhibit explicitly a function which historical studies should serve in improving current philosophical accounts of the logic of support.
It would be wise to preface these considerations with an explicit acknowledgement of certain major differences between history and philosophy of science. Historical study is, in the first instance, concrete and descriptive. It delves into detail, seeking to understand the concrete particularity of complex and complexly interrelated individuals and events. Accordingly, it employs a variety of techniques which are not useful in abstract philosophical study. Practicing it well requires total immersion in the wealth of historical detail. Historians begin by facing a virtually seamless web of entanglements among scientific tradition, social and intellectual context, personality clashes, religious and theological considerations, and so on. The demarcation between "internal" and "external" history of science is by no means obvious; in Giere's words, "Everything is potentially relevant" ([17], p. 295) . From the abstract, normative point of view in technical philosophy of science, this universality of potential relevance is anathema. Philosophers must exclude the "irrelevant" ("accidental,'' "external") details which form the substance of many historical studies in order to achieve abstract accounts of the structure of ideal science and the allied norms governing it. To do this, they demarcate science rigorously from the enterprises with which it is historically interlocked. They cannot, of course, eliminate or exclude the "external" influences which constantly affect science and scientists, but their formal techniques cannot foresee or take into account the specific influences relevant to given cases with which historians are concerned.
These differences in the concerns of historians and philosophers contribute to the difficulty of achieving the interaction which I shall advocate and to the difficulty of recognizing the need for it.
Problem: Which rational reconstruction(s) of a specific theory, explanation, or confirmatory argument should a philosopher use? Partial answer: One constraint, at least, is "that the explication 'resemble' the explicatum" ([17], p. 291) .
Discussion: Philosophers do not use or investigate theories in the same ways, or with the same purposes as scientists. Unlike scientists, they do not often seek to maximize calculational efficiency or to reveal new empirical results. Because their concerns are philosophical, the formulations and reconstructions of interest to philosophers are typically more abstract and further from the empirical and calculational surface than those of interest to scientists. This is as it should be. But it imposes an obligation on philosophers-namely to show that the idealized versions (rational reconstructions) of theories which they employ correspond adequately with the (changing) scientific realities and that they fruitfully capture aspects of real theories relevant to philosophical concerns.30 Use of the criterion of resemblance by the philosopher, especially when it is combined with certain claims about the nature of theories (cf. below, pp. 34 ff.) requires him to pay serious attention to the actual course of science. Giere, who holds that there is no essential difference between contemporary science and earlier science, holds that historical study is not needed to acquire the requisite understanding of the actual course of science. The philosopher may legitimately restrict his attention to contemporary cases; in dealing with them, it is enough "to pay closer attention [than the logical empiricists did] to actual scientific theories, and to worry more about the nature of philosophical conclusions about science" ([17], p. 291) . 31 Even if Giere is correct (which I do not grant), his concession that the resemblance criterion is appropriate brings with it rather more than he has publicly acknowledged in the way of dependence upon historical study. "Actual scientific theories" are not givens; indeed, an issue lurking at the center of the dispute between historicists and logicists is how to characterize and formulate theories and theory support perspicuously. Consider theories: they are not easily recoverable from textbooks. properly parsed and dated statements of the total relevant evidence available during the period in which the theory has been tested, together with properly parsed and dated statements of the theory, its best competitor(s), the various adjustments made in them, and the predictions based on them.
This formulation allows a more realistic account of theory testing along the lines proposed by Giere and has the merit of explicitly acknowledging the relevance to theory assessment of a theory's resilience and of its comparative standing. These virtues, however, come at the cost of complicating the relation between a logistically tidy formulation of the theory as it stands at any given time and the process of assessment. Logicism as thus revised is a form of minimal historicism. I shall argue shortly that it does not go far enough in its response to historicist criticism because it fails to take proper account of the role of background knowledge and because it does not recognize the deeply historical character of theories. But let us assume for the moment that this weakening of logicism will prove adequate for the purposes of EE. What would follow regarding the importance of historical study for these purposes? According to clause (Liib') there are universally valid evaluative techniques which, in their application, require modest historical information. Specifically required is information about the temporal order of empirical discoveries and theoretical derivations and knowledge of the interaction among a theory, its competitors, and recalcitrant data. In contemporary cases, such information will often belong to the "common knowledge" of the It would be worth investigating whether changes in background knowledge, perhaps even distant background knowledge, are partially responsible for the well-known but surprisingly high incidence of simultaneous discovery in the history of science. If such a connection could be shown, it would tend to support the claim that background knowledge affects the rational credibility of hypotheses.
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belief rather than belief proper as (in general) rcquiring justification. 39 Rational acceptability is thus an ecological matter. One of the most important, sensitive, and difficult jobs of the innovative scientist is to determine which parts of the background he can ignore as irrelevant, as sufficiently adjustable, or as ultimately overthrowable, and which parts of it must be made to cohere in relatively short order with his hypothesis, theory, or point of view if the latter is to be worthy of further investigation or, ultimately, of belief. To appreciate the delicacy of such considerations, one should realize that major segments of the background knowledge may occasionally be placed in epistemic jeopardy. For example, judged by a rigid standard of coherence with the background knowledge, Galileo's heliocentrism can only count as irrational. Yet, clearly, if our standards of rationality are to be at all acceptable, his rejection of much of the Aristotelian background must be evaluated positively and the criticisms based on the lack of coherence between his theory and that background overriden.
The philosopher probably cannot offer general guidelines or criteria for the adequacy of the solutions to these extremely delicate and highly contextual problems, but he cannot evade the philosophical problems posed by the division of background beliefs into relevant and irrelevant and by the need to weight the coherence with background beliefs against other epistemic desiderata.
Moral: Logicism must be weakened to accomodate minimal historicism. This makes the comparative standing and resilience (among other properties) of theories relevant to their evaluation. These properties cannot be assessed without essential reliance on historiographical techniques and empirical study. Furthermore, proper evaluation of a theory's rationality is contextual: it requires knowledge of the relevant background of beliefs, problems, theories, experiments, and instruments affecting the application of and support for the theory. Knowledge of this background depends on knowledge of the historical context in which the theory is used.
Final Problem: What is a theory? Partial answer: A theory is a 39Nelson Goodman's well-known views have just this structure. The primary ground against accepting claims employing grue-like predicates is the lack of projectability of those predicates. Projectability thus becomes essential to the evaluation of inductive inferences and theoretical claims. But projectability is a nonformal property depending on the history of term usage (and thus, inter alia, on the cultural context): though the projectability of a particular term may depend on its logical and definitional relations to other terms, projectability is ultimately determined by the entrenchment of predicates employed extensively by the relevant community. growing, developing entity,40 one which cannot be understood as a static structure. Discussion: What is it then that scientists learn from ahistorical textbooks when they learn, say, the special theory of relativity or the synthetic theory of evolution? "Unless one is willing to claim that most scientists really do not understand the theories in their fields and could not learn them from standard texts, the claim that history necessarily enters consideration of the structure of theories must be rejected" ([17], p. 293 Theories, then, are historical entities which cannot always be identified or fully understood by reference to the formal structures and empirical consequences of their extant versions. Their developmental capacities must be taken into account-a task which typically requires one to learn something about their developmental histories and their intellectual and physical environments. As they develop, their long-term potentialities alter in ways which can be estimated, 42Compare [47] on the different formulations employed by different disciplinary and professional subgroups and on the degradation of specific content required to achieve generally comprehensible cross-disciplinary formulations. Ravetz states the point most succinctly in connection with his account of the evolution of what he calls facts, but the point is a general one.
43Of particular importance is the fact that the time scale on which versions of theories develop and new versions of theories are elaborated is frequently much greater than that of a scientific career. Thus an examination of the long-term historical context of a theory version may prove a useful critical tool in the attempt to improve current formulations of the theory, for it may help bring them in line with the spirit of the theoretical program to which they belong or it may result in a better understanding of the available alternatives to current formulations. 36 one ought to utilize considerable historical information regarding the theoretical background; the status of neighboring and auxiliary theories; the temporal order among experimental discoveries, theoretical derivations and predictions by competing theories; and so on. In particular, it is well known that scientists take account of a wider range of background information in evaluating theories-and deciding how to test them than standard philosophical accounts of theory evaluating and testing suggest they should. This poses serious problems regarding the determination of those factors, if any, in the background which philosophers ought to consider relevant-and regarding the correctness of current philosophical theories of support and testing. The resolution of these issues requires serious examination of accurate case studies. But accuracy is, of course, not enough-the case studies must be shaped so as to yield information about the kinds of background information considered relevant, the uses to which it is put, the reasoning by which these uses are justified, and so on. 
